中国农村土地征收补偿暨城中村改造实务操作与维权保障 pdf mobi txt 2024 电子版 下载

《中国农村土地征收补偿暨城中村改造实务操作与维权保障》依据最新农村土地征收补偿与城中村改造相关法律、法规、政策规定编著，系农村土地征收补偿与城中村改造实务操作和维权保障方面的最新法律实务著作，结合实务和案例对农村土地征收补偿与城中村改造中的实务操作和维权保障进行了深入阐释，旨在为相关读者提供全面、实用的实务操作与维权指引。

《中国农村土地征收补偿暨城中村改造实务操作与维权保障》既适合从事农村土地征收补偿与城中村改造的国家机关及公务员使用，也适合被征地的农村集体经济组织、村民委员会、村民小组、村民及其他权利人和城中村改造房屋及其附属物的所有权人维护其合法权益使用。

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《中国农村土地征收补偿暨城中村改造实务操作与维权保障》依据最新农村土地征收补偿与城中村改造相关法律、法规、政策规定编著，系农村土地征收补偿与城中村改造实务操作和维权保障方面的最新法律实务著作，结合实务和案例对农村土地征收补偿与城中村改造中的实务操作和维权保障进行了深入阐释，旨在为相关读者提供全面、实用的实务操作与维权指引。

《中国农村土地征收补偿暨城中村改造实务操作与维权保障》既适合从事农村土地征收补偿与城中村改造的国家机关及公务员使用，也适合被征地的农村集体经济组织、村民委员会、村民小组、村民及其他权利人和城中村改造房屋及其附属物的所有权人维护其合法权益使用。

• 作者：庄周梦蝶 发布时间：2021-06-27 17:49:33

  仍然局限于意识是大脑的产物这一层面，对于种种根本问题的误导性——不知编者是有意识还是无意识。

• 作者：zeen 发布时间：2021-04-24 01:40:09

  臆测，比公羊传更离谱

• 作者：小白 发布时间：2020-05-31 13:08:47

  二年级读物

• 作者：泥沼怪物小汪 发布时间：2022-05-13 10:23:31

  本来想好好记一下吃啥，看完反而觉得，嗯，保持食材新鲜丰富就行，能保持身体健康的都是普通的食物✓

  认真生活从买菜开始。

• 作者：BlueJophy 发布时间：2010-02-03 11:35:06

  很有用，超级推荐

• 作者：晓口袋 发布时间：2016-06-19 18:00:30

  人头真大

• 征途美国读书笔记

  作者：摩西 发布时间：2021-11-08 10:34:41

  1、从种族、家族、个人理解美国，帮派圈：Blood in，Blood out。

  2、个人崇尚：individual initiative，个人的主动性。认为政府是necessary evi，要通过check and balance来防止。个人成长有个仪式叫rite of passage，其中一个步骤就是犯错。

  3、美国政治五类角色：politician，civil servant，political staff，think tank，lobby

  4、美国企业CEO要承担责任和错误，不能推卸给别人。The buck stops here.(责任到此，不能再推）。

  5、美国名校强调对别人产生的价值。Living is giving。美国名校的资源：优秀教授资源（office hour）、海外的资源和社交的资源。

  6、真正优秀的创业者具备abundance mindset，一开始不懂不要紧，一回生二回熟，"Fake it until you make it"，职场中更看重有没有自己的想法，并且表达出来影响到周围的人。从老板的思路考虑问题，把自己想做篮球场的乔丹。

  7、老虎基金中国投资人Scott Shleifer:投资怎么精准又成功？1、盯着你关心行业里的公司，想出能想到的所有问题，穷尽一切去问为什么。2、获得答案后独立思考，有自己的观点和角度。

• 转载一篇国外学者的书评的书评

  作者：benshuier 发布时间：2011-04-23 23:15:28

  原文网址

  http://www.froginawell.net/china/2006/04/review-of-timothy-brooks-collaboration/

  我没得到作者授权就私自拿来了...如果要引用的话请多加注意

  Review of Timothy Brook’s Collaboration

  Filed under: Books China-Japan English War— K. M. Lawson @ 7:33 pm Print

  In the most recent issue of The Journal of Asian Studies there is a review of Timothy Brook‘s new work Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China written by Susan Glosser. I was very disappointed with this review which, except for a few conciliatory lines in the beginning of the review, was very critical of Brook’s work. While I agree with Glosser on one or two points, I found her to be far too harsh, sometimes irrelevant (she complains that he does not offer a glossary with the Chinese names of all the organizations mentioned, but they can be found under the index entry for every organization) and in several instances clearly wrong in her assessment of the book, which I believe is a truly excellent contribution to the scholarship on Chinese collaboration during the occupation.

  Timothy Brook’s work is a careful look at the issues surrounding Chinese wartime collaboration through a close examination of a number of case studies from the Yangtze delta. With the exception of some work I have read in Japanese and some coming out of Taiwan, this is the most detailed source based research I have seen of this kind to date.

  Here I just want to contest three points in Glosser’s critique of Brook’s work that I think particularly unfair. She argues that 1) Brook doesn’t discuss the “problem of generalizing from one city to another.” 2) She complains about Brook’s allegedly unproblematized use of the word “pacification” (such as in referring to Japan’s “pacification teams.”) 3) Glosser spends almost a third of the review critiquing Brook’s “desire to avoid moral judgments” and his allegedly “neutral stance” on issue of Chinese collaboration.

  On the first count, Glosser is certainly correct in worrying about the generalization involved, but I think Brook is also well aware of the dangers and admirably avoids them in many places more adventurous scholars would not. He has already focused his study on only one area of occupied China, the Yangtze delta, and laments, in some detail, the paucity of available sources. He goes into considerable length to describe his sources and the various problems which accompany them in his opening chapter, even showing specific examples of the kinds of contradictions present and strategies he used. He works with Japanese sources (writings of the pacification team members), Chinese sources (such as memoirs), and Western sources (witnesses in Nanjing, for example) depending on their availability.

  I am more than satisfied by his explanation that, “I chose seven cities and counties across the Yangtze Delta for intensive study. This selection was not based on whether the sites were typical or unique (some would prove to be one, some the other, and some both), but only on whether the documentation was sufficiently dense to allow for a more than superficial portrait of what local people did in the face of military occupation…After the case studies were written, I chose to include in the book five that were sufficiently distinct in terms of the themes that the sources allowed me to explore…”1 and did not find any of his major claims to be based solely on individual findings in any one city or place. On the contrary, I imagine the accusation of generalization would be particularly offensive to Brook since he has urged the reader to try to overcome some of the stereotypes and classic images we have of the wartime collaborators and allow for the many different forms and levels of cooperation with the occupying forces, their varying motivations, costs, and ultimately levels of moral responsibility.

  Glosser for some reason takes issue with the fact that Brook uses the term “pacification teams” which is a direct translation of the Japanese term. She seems so concerned that we maintain a sufficiently condemnatory tone in our work on Japan’s activities in occupied China that this direct translation doesn’t seem to be sufficiently insidious. I find no issue with the fact that he calls these teams by the best English translation available (“pacification” is originally 宣撫, which in one of its two related definitions in Japanese specifically means to pacify a people in an occupied territory), especially since he does not, by this, ever try to hide the fact that the Japanese were guilty of horrible atrocities.

  She says that he uses the word “pacification” for “his own description of events (p. 134)” but I can’t find any use of that word on the page, for any purpose. Instead, page 134 makes use of another term which we are all familiar with, when he discusses Japanese “counterinsurgency operations” in Nanjing. It is on the same page where he notes Japanese military promises to offer “care for disarmed Chinese soldiers” even as they carried out a policy of executing captured soldiers in Nanjing and, at the bottom of that page tells of the summary execution of fifty policemen which had just been promised permission to operate after negotiations with Nanjing’s International Committee.

  Finally, Glosser seems to think that Brook has a “neutral stance” with respect to collaboration and wants to “avoid moral judgments.” I’m afraid this kind of comment shows that she has completely misread Brook’s careful argument. Perhaps she missed Brook’s simple request in his introduction that, “All I ask of the reader is to suspend judgment as to who is guilty for having worked with the Japanese until after we have seen them at work.”2 Brook wants to point out that the costs and consequences of collaboration, its form, and the motivations are all very much tied up in the contingencies of specific situations. Also, he reminds us that, “Ambiguity of intention is only half the problem. There is also the ambiguity of unknowable consequences.”3 He is “neutral” to collaboration in one important respect: the word “collaboration” is already a morally loaded word, and I think he would argue that without some special care, this can get in the way of any interesting and productive look at the interactions between Chinese and Japanese during the war.

  I think Glosser fundamentally misunderstands Brook when she protests his claim that “history does not fashion moral subjects, nor produce moral knowledge.” I completely agree with her when she says that, “All histories [are] embedded in an ethical view of the world.”4 However, I’m not sure how Brook is to be understood as denying this. Brook admits how his own “ethical view of the world” has affected his description of some of the historical figures he describes in the book. On the very same page as his comment about moral knowledge, he has this to say, “Without question, many of [the choices of collaborators] were venal in inspiration and destructive in impact, and the historian is not disqualified from documenting that venality or tracking the damage these choices led to and declaring them to be damaging. I have found it impossible to suspend my personal distaste for some of the characters who appear in this book, and it would be facetious to suggest that the reader should, particularly when the consequences of collaboration were as stark as they were in a place like Nanjing.” I think what Brook, who it might be noted collected and edited the important Documents on the Rape of Nanking (1999), wants to argue for is a more careful consideration of some of the “inconvenient facts” that produce a more complex picture – a complexity that we must face if we are to have any chance at understanding the kinds of choices faced by individuals every day in extreme times. It is because of some of these ambiguities that we cannot “deduce the causes that prompted people to act from the moral claims we impose, nor evaluate their actions solely in relation to consequences the actors could not anticipate.”5 This is as true for collaborators with the Japanese occupation regime as it is with anyone who collaborated with Chinese Communist regime in its most violent hour, and as it is for the daily choices of policemen, soldiers and government officials of an occupied Iraq today. An analytic calculus of atrocity and the clarity of hindsight does not help us in the least in understanding the people thrust into extreme positions during times such as war, occupation, imperial domination, or under highly repressive governments — or for that matter the choices they faced.

  1. Timothy Brook Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 26-27.

  2. ibid. 13.

  3. ibid. 241.

  4. Susan Glossar review of Brook’s book in Journal of Asian Studies vol. 65 no. 1, 149