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《公司法剖析:比较与功能的视角》是对公司法所作的精要剖析。作者的立论前提是各国公司法都要解决以下三大基本代理问题：经营者对股东的机会主义行为、控制股东对小股东实施的机会主义行为以及股东群体对其他公司利益相关者(债权人与雇员)实施的机会主义行为。各国都必须在纷繁复杂的公司内部关系及其与产品、劳动力、资本与控制权市场的互动关系中解决以上三大问题。

作者的核心观点是，各国的公司形态大同小异，更令人惊讶的是，各国为解决三大代理问题往往在相同的备选法律策略中作出选择，尽管选择的策略有时并不雷同。

第一章　何谓公司法

1.1　导言

1.2　何谓公司?

1.2.1　法律人格

1.2.2　有限责任

1.2.3　股份自由转让

1.2.4　董事会结构下的授权经营管理

1.2.5　投资者所有权

1.3　公司法包含什么?

1.3.1　附属性和部分性的公司形式

1.3.2　公司法的其他渊源

1.3.3　非公司法约束机制

1.4　公司法的目标是什么?

第二章　代理问题与法律对策

2.1　三大代理问题

2.2　降低代理成本的法律对策

2.2.1　规制型策略

2.2.2　治理型策略

2.2.3　事前与事后策略

2.3　公司领域中的法律对策

2.4　法律的作用

第三章　公司治理基本结构

3.1　公司治理策略如何保护股东整体利益

3.1.1　任免权策略

3.1.2　其他策略：决策权、信托、激励机制、约束机制和从属权

3.2　保护小股东

3.2.1　任免权策略

3.2.2　决策权策略

3.2.3　信托策略

3.2.4　经济激励机制、约束机制和从属权策略

3.2.5　有关小股东和大股东之间利益冲突的思考

3.3　保护非股东利益相关者

3.3.1　任免权策略

3.3.2　信托策略

3.3.3　约束机制

3.4　公司治理模式

第四章　债权人保护

4.1　公司法为什么要保护债权人?

4.1.1　濒临破产的公司

4.1.2　公司集团

4.1.3　非自愿债权人

4.2　债权人保护的规制策略

4.2.1　强制披露——准入策略

4.2.2　调整法定资本和公司集团的规则

4.2.3　诚信义务——标准策略

4.3　对债权人保护差异的解释

4.3.1　差异的内容

4.3.2　差异的重要性

第五章　关联交易

5.1　经营者实施的利益冲突交易

5.1.1　强制披露：从属策略

5.1.2　无利害关系董事会的批准：信托策略

5.1.3　股东投票：决策权策略

5.1.4　禁止利益冲突交易：规则策略

5.1.5　忠实义务：标准策略

5.2　涉及控制股东的交易

5.2.1　强制披露：从属策略

5.2.2　董事会和股东会批准：信托与决策权策略

5.2.3　诚信义务和公平原则：标准策略

5.3　对关联交易规制差异的解释

第六章　公司重大行为

第七章　控制权交易

第八章　发行人监管和投资者保护

第九章　剖析之外的思考

索引

莱纳·克拉克曼，哈佛大学法学院艾泽拉·赛耶尔教授。他讲授公司法与公司财务，并发表了大量有关公司组织形式与公司责任对策的经济分析论文。他与葳廉·T.阿伦合著了《商事组织法诠释与判例》（阿斯潘出版社，2003年版）。他还向我俄罗斯共和国以及越南社会主义共和国就公司法改革提供咨询意见。他近期发表的文章包括：与伯纳德·布莱克、安娜·塔拉索娃合著的《俄罗斯私有化与公司治理：错在何处？》等。

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书籍介绍

《公司法剖析:比较与功能的视角》是对公司法所作的精要剖析。作者的立论前提是各国公司法都要解决以下三大基本代理问题：经营者对股东的机会主义行为、控制股东对小股东实施的机会主义行为以及股东群体对其他公司利益相关者(债权人与雇员)实施的机会主义行为。各国都必须在纷繁复杂的公司内部关系及其与产品、劳动力、资本与控制权市场的互动关系中解决以上三大问题。

作者的核心观点是，各国的公司形态大同小异，更令人惊讶的是，各国为解决三大代理问题往往在相同的备选法律策略中作出选择，尽管选择的策略有时并不雷同。

• 作者：周颂来 发布时间：2018-05-12 08:23:32

  为了写史龙的 paper 看的

• 作者：[已注销] 发布时间：2012-04-21 16:47:29

  第一本接触英美公司法的书~仪式情结~

• 作者：番丁 发布时间：2011-12-03 10:15:21

  比较法分析的典范！结构清晰，分析一针见血。翻译勉强可用。不过，这么好的书，还是找英文版的来看吧。

• 作者：头发 发布时间：2023-02-25 17:26:37

  作协作家这个水平？

• 作者：withinbeyond 发布时间：2014-09-25 01:25:13

  虽然对实务不明白，但写得很厉害很清晰的样子……

• 作者：静嘉张 发布时间：2018-05-01 14:11:37

  这本书已经有了罗培新的新译本，但我读的是旧版，没有作比较，从阅读感受上觉得文从字顺，流畅自然。就《公司法剖析》本身来说，所讨论的都是大关节的问题，如大小股东的利益冲突、公司内部人与公司外部人之间的利益冲突、股东与经营者之间的利益冲突等三大代理难题，以公司法的经济逻辑为方法论，采用比较的视野，超越特定国家的公司法而提供一种分析框架。

• 比较经典的书

  作者：豆瓣酱 发布时间：2009-09-24 15:50:42

  在学校的时候认真看了几遍英文版的。掌握了里面的内容也就掌握了公司法中最基础也是最重要的原理，很多问题都能迎刃而解。学公司法的，不能不看。

• The Rationale of Corporate Law

  作者：嘿哈嘿哈 发布时间：2012-11-30 20:25:22

  To dispel the haunting question "What is the nature and rationale of corporate law?", one should read this book. For corporate laws arround the world (six developed countries: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US), this book reveals their natures, justifies their existence and identifies contemporary thinkings surrounding them. Although not being a legal guy, i found this book quite easy to read, probably because of its close tie to corporate finance.

  Viewing from a larger picture, corporate law is one conponent under the nexus of law and finance. Finance laws are sometimes viewed as governmental constraints on the purely voluntary economic activies in a laissez faire market. In some circumstances, they also enble activities never practiced by the market. In both cases, they govern the basic economic and business activities arround companies and have different roles associated with differing activities.

  Based on their roles, lines can be drawn to assort three levels of finance laws. The level 1 contains basic laws: property, contract and tort. They serve the public by empowering the recognition of property rights and enforcement of contracts. The level 3 laws are security laws, mostly SEC regulations, regulating transactions of ownership, assets and liabilities.

  Level 2 law is the underlying topic in this book: corporate law. Comparing to basic laws, it presents a more complicated case; comparing to security laws, it is often less controvesial. I think the reason is that corporate law is contractarian in nature; the agency relationship resembles a contract between citizens and governments. Clearly my view is only partially right. The book offers a much better description of the essence of corporate law as the limited liability and rules of corporate governance. In order to receive the benefits of limited liability for shareholders, corporations must abide by the rules of corporate governance law. The later mainly concerns the allocation of power among the common shareholders, the board of directors, and corporate managment. The most fundamental power stays with common shareholders who can vote directors and make several fundamental decisions for the company; the directors supervise the management and company's business, but not on a daily basis; management hired by directors is in charge of daily operations.

  The essense of corporate can also be seen in its five identified characteristics stated in chapter 1: 1) legal personality, 2) limited liability, 3) transferable shares, 4) delegated management under a board structure, and 5) investor ownership. Corporate law also effectively deals with conflicts among stakeholders, the "agency problems", of three types: 1) conflicts between managers and shareholders, 2) conflicts among shareholders, and 3) conflicts between shareholders and the corporation’s other constituencies, including creditors and employees. Chapter 2 dicusses these three agency problems with pratical preventive and corrective legal strategies.

  Chapter 3 - 9 deal with common transactions and decisions in corporation covering almost all important problems in corporate law. The orginal corporate activities are first presented, derived agency problems are then dicussed, the range of alternative legal responses are recommended, and lastly patterns of problems and resolutions are compared accross different jurisdictions. These insights are written in such a plain language and are so fundamental that they should serve as introductory material for any law students and business profesionals.

  In regard to the diferences in corporate law between the six countries, the book considers different patterns of ownership as the culprit. The US and UK public firms tend to have widely distributed onwerships possessed ny numerious small investors; Japanese firms tend to favor share coalitions; European firms are often owned by institutional or family controlling shareholders. The variation of ownership styles contributes to the difference in corporate laws of these jurisdictions.

  Overall, the book explicates the most fundamental rationale of corporate law and offers full review of agency problems and legal solutions. Anyone in legal or business professions should not miss it.