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《秩序的沦陷》为著名汉学家卜正民教授近著，关注的是抗战初期的社会与人。作者选取江南五城（嘉定、镇江、南京、上海、崇明）为例，描述了日军残暴占领城市、试图重建基层机构的过程，并分析地方头面人物与日伪政府的关系交织。“这里有通敌，有抵抗，但两者之外的其他行为要多得多。”借助对这种模糊行为的分析，作者考察了战争时期城市秩序的维持，以及生活其间的个人的心态、处境与选择，以求揭示一个复杂的战时社会。

致谢

略语表

第一章 关于“合作”

第二章 计划

第三章 外观：嘉定

第四章 成本：镇江

第五章 共谋：南京

第六章 竞争：上海

第七章 抵抗：崇明

第八章 组建占领政权

结论 消失的四类历史真相

注释

参考文献

索引

卜正民，著名汉学家，历任多伦多大学、斯坦福大学等校教授，英国牛津大学邵氏汉学教授，现为加拿大英属哥伦比亚大学圣约翰学院历史系教授。卜正民学术视野广阔，主要从事亚洲历史和文化的研究，研究领域涉及明代社会和文化史、“二战”时期日本在中国的占领等。代表著作有：《为权力祈祷：佛教与晚明中国士绅社会的形成》、《纵乐的困惑：明代的商业与文化》、《明代的国家与社会》、《维梅尔的帽子：从一幅画看全球化贸易的兴起》、《杀千刀：中西视野下的凌迟处死》等。

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1937至1945年日本占领中国是完全另外一回事。维持占领的费用庞大，而从这些支离破碎的占领地区汲取财富和资源的前景黯淡，且贯穿战争始终。中国当时现代经济部门极其不发达，以至于不能快速产生汇报；其通信设施落后，以至于不能执行高压政治；民族主义力量又是如此强大，以至于日本占领者不支付巨额镇压费用就无法进行经济剥削。.......我们不知道合作者是否合算，但占领者确实不合算。

与法国人相比，中国人接受占领事实方面还远远停留在早期阶段。一方面，日本人从不澄清在太平洋战争中的罪责。也从不为在中国犯下的侵略行为提供补偿，这使中国人继续感到恼火和耻辱。另一方面，许多中国人也不打算审视他们受难和抵抗的集体记忆之外的东西，而去追问战争期间的占领区内大多数民众在做什么。对海峡两岸的政治精英而言，抵抗的神话一直是强有力的道德武器，他们利用这件武器来继续维持战后的统治。国共两党各自声称是本党打败了日本帝国主义，他们都将自己的道德合法性——也就是他们统治的正当性——投注在这个上面。然而对这场战争思考，还不止于此。自战争以来，很多中国人身怀民族的羞耻感，战后中国政府的治国无方更加剧了这种羞辱感。然而，因为执着于日本人拒不承认错误，拒不偿还债务的意识，使得中国人并未仔细审查自己政府过去的行为和历史：打破关于那场战争的一般流行观点，稍稍转移对外部侵略者的谴责，并对20世纪中国人对中国人的所作所为承担起责任。这有可能会暴露出隐藏于这些观点背后的政治精英的个人利益，无论是革命的还是其他方面的利益。

谴责那些一直与日本占领者合作的中国人卖国求荣，可能曲解了中国文化背景中意识形态的作用。“占领政府”的头头们确实发表声明，支持日本人的泛亚洲主义论调，但很难发现哪怕是为数极少的、实质性的证据来证明他们认真考虑过日本人的战略目标。很多支持日本的人基本上是希望赶走蒋介石的国民政府，而不是真的接受和认同日本人的理想。中国的合作者和日本人都将合作看作是一种工具，前者还似乎有过之而无不及。这或许就是汉语语言很难造出类似英文“collaboration”（有贬义）一词的原因。在沦陷时期，所有的中国合作者都认为日本的战领是临时性的，他们在等待占领的结束，直到国家主权完全回到中国人手里——更确切地说，回到他们自己的手中。

这些“县知事”对统治区域到底控制到什么程度，则是另一回事。很多人发现，虽然日本人将对手国民党赶出县城，但却并没能将其驱除出县境。在日本人不易到达的地方，国民党的政权以不同方式继续存在，且运行良好。1938年蒋介石国民政府一份报告指出，被战争影响的796个县中，国民政府不能行使权力的只有59个。尽管这个数据有点夸大，炫耀国民政府的控制程度，但它确实表明了日伪南京中央政府对基层社会的控制极其有限。“维新政府”的日本顾问也提供了不太精确的相关数字，这也部分证实了当时的情形。他们统计的数据是：1938年底，“维新政府”任命的“县知事”情况是：江苏21个（其中长江以北只有一个），浙江12个，安徽10个，总共43个。43和59之间的差距由“自治会”来填补，由当地日本驻军保证他们的安全。这表明日军推进到哪里，“占领政府”才能延伸到哪里，其范围一般不会远离县城城墙。通常的情况是一县之内有三个不同政权任命的行政机构：“维新政府”在县城内，共产党和国民党在山区的某个地方，三者之间相互竞争。因此，1940年初的镇江由郭志诚“知事”代表“占领政府”，占据县城；庄培方（音译）是国民政府任命的县长，盘踞在西南一带的山沟沟里；共产党县长李培根建立的县政府活跃在本县的东部地区。在日本占领中国期间，三者各据一方，分别行使各自政府的权力。

1943年，一位被遣返回国的美国人，如此刻画他所认识的、为“占领政府”工作的人：他们“不是某个特定的阶层，而是机会主义者、保守分子，以及那些因这样那样缘故失意于蒋介石政权的人”。特务部官员们清楚地意识到这种形势及他们的可靠性问题。一个被派到山东做“宣抚”工作的官员抱怨道：“如果我们仅仅在征服区找个清朝遗老，将县政权交给70岁以上的‘县知事’，那么我认为我们所从事的政治，与蒋介石时期的政治相比，至少落后50年。”使“占领政府”生存下去的唯一希望是“比国民党再向前迈一步，用新的精神作为政治的思想基础”。“宣抚”工作正是在这个方面失败了。具有创新意识的国民党党员没来合作。那些被“特务部”安排出任领导的人，要么是品质极差的旧领袖，要么是没有创新思想的新来者，“占领政府”没有社会和文化网络使老一辈起作用，或使新一代合法化。······

日本人希望，随着时间的推移，“占领政府”会累积一些权威。然而，它在基层社会普遍执行的高压政治，且无力与在野地方头面人物结盟，侵蚀了这种权威。这种侵蚀作用大大帮助了共产党，使其在战后获得了基层社会的统治权。当比外国军事占领更长远的政治力量走上舞台时，地方遗老的合法性和政治活力无论如何都会走向消亡。军事占领确实加快了这一进程，它消除了那些留下来的甚至没有参与合作的地方头面人物的合法性权威，这导致战后归来的国民党政府失去了与地方权力的联系。最终取得胜利的是共产党政府，共产党没有借助于地方头面人物的威信，而是依靠严密的纪律、自上而下绝对服从的政策，以及足够的力量。一旦内战的应急措施让位于常规化的政治控制，共产党便能取而代之。合作者为这一结局起了推波助澜的作用。

加藤是第二批从大连来到上海的“宣抚”职员。他在外滩青衿银行（the Seikin Bank）上面的满铁上海事务所住了十来天。

书籍介绍

《秩序的沦陷》为著名汉学家卜正民教授近著，关注的是抗战初期的社会与人。作者选取江南五城（嘉定、镇江、南京、上海、崇明）为例，描述了日军残暴占领城市、试图重建基层机构的过程，并分析地方头面人物与日伪政府的关系交织。“这里有通敌，有抵抗，但两者之外的其他行为要多得多。”借助对这种模糊行为的分析，作者考察了战争时期城市秩序的维持，以及生活其间的个人的心态、处境与选择，以求揭示一个复杂的战时社会。

• 作者：豆友4764757 发布时间：2021-01-21 18:26:43

  2019-4-7 中译标题与副标题文不对题，看来也是一种自我审查式的无奈之举了，卜正民在结论所说的“第二种干扰合作史研究的评判是政治层面的”，恰恰在本书标题上印证了，真是讽刺。不过能出版也是功德无量。鉴于材料的稀缺，研究做到这个水平也没什么可以苛责的了。但是还是感觉外国人不是很能深度理解collaboration在国人文化心理层面的问题。于我而言，此书给我的惊艳的地方在于collaboration破坏了基层传统精英的政治合法性，倒是便宜了CCP以严格的纪律性规范夺取基层政权。

• 作者：奥数帝 发布时间：2019-06-05 17:19:46

  以前就觉得合作者有很多种，不全是汉奸，本书又向我叙述了这种事实。虽然现在的我知道合作者有很多面孔，觉得这书啰嗦、观点不新颖。但未来的人、其他国家的人他们未必知道。

• 作者：rainbug 发布时间：2017-11-02 22:10:39

  材料太少，观点也只是常识，但是很欣赏这样的写法。

• 作者：树上 发布时间：2019-01-09 20:40:24

  材料不多，写得啰嗦，枯燥无味。

• 作者：无声深处 发布时间：2012-12-04 09:33:27

  层次很低，我现在对作者产生了严重的怀疑。。。也许这正印证了他说的，蓝色就是瞧不起红色。

• 作者：犹在镜中 发布时间：2019-12-03 17:32:47

  历史是由芸芸众生创造的，也是由芸芸众生体验着。

• 还原战时社会的复杂性

  作者：倪雪君 发布时间：2015-11-06 12:28:26

        著名汉学家卜正民的这部著作，选择了抗战研究中两个不常为人关注的主题：

        一是“秩序”。日本人残暴地攻占了城市，但要重建一套秩序，则需要更多的手腕。他们发现利用品德低下的通敌者并不能达成目的，于是开始与原先秩序中的“地方头面人物”打交道。是勾结？是交换？还是抵制？围绕“秩序”所发生的关系交织远比战争要复杂得多。

        二是“小人物”。战火纷飞之际，并非所有人都能抛家舍业，更多窘困、迷茫的中国老百姓情愿留在故土。他们该如何选择？作者以嘉定、镇江、南京、上海、崇明为例，利用了中日双方大量的档案与回忆录，试图将一些长期隐秘于大历史中的小人物勾勒出来。

• 转载一篇国外学者的书评的书评

  作者：benshuier 发布时间：2011-04-23 23:15:28

  原文网址

  http://www.froginawell.net/china/2006/04/review-of-timothy-brooks-collaboration/

  我没得到作者授权就私自拿来了...如果要引用的话请多加注意

  Review of Timothy Brook’s Collaboration

  Filed under: Books China-Japan English War— K. M. Lawson @ 7:33 pm Print

  In the most recent issue of The Journal of Asian Studies there is a review of Timothy Brook‘s new work Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China written by Susan Glosser. I was very disappointed with this review which, except for a few conciliatory lines in the beginning of the review, was very critical of Brook’s work. While I agree with Glosser on one or two points, I found her to be far too harsh, sometimes irrelevant (she complains that he does not offer a glossary with the Chinese names of all the organizations mentioned, but they can be found under the index entry for every organization) and in several instances clearly wrong in her assessment of the book, which I believe is a truly excellent contribution to the scholarship on Chinese collaboration during the occupation.

  Timothy Brook’s work is a careful look at the issues surrounding Chinese wartime collaboration through a close examination of a number of case studies from the Yangtze delta. With the exception of some work I have read in Japanese and some coming out of Taiwan, this is the most detailed source based research I have seen of this kind to date.

  Here I just want to contest three points in Glosser’s critique of Brook’s work that I think particularly unfair. She argues that 1) Brook doesn’t discuss the “problem of generalizing from one city to another.” 2) She complains about Brook’s allegedly unproblematized use of the word “pacification” (such as in referring to Japan’s “pacification teams.”) 3) Glosser spends almost a third of the review critiquing Brook’s “desire to avoid moral judgments” and his allegedly “neutral stance” on issue of Chinese collaboration.

  On the first count, Glosser is certainly correct in worrying about the generalization involved, but I think Brook is also well aware of the dangers and admirably avoids them in many places more adventurous scholars would not. He has already focused his study on only one area of occupied China, the Yangtze delta, and laments, in some detail, the paucity of available sources. He goes into considerable length to describe his sources and the various problems which accompany them in his opening chapter, even showing specific examples of the kinds of contradictions present and strategies he used. He works with Japanese sources (writings of the pacification team members), Chinese sources (such as memoirs), and Western sources (witnesses in Nanjing, for example) depending on their availability.

  I am more than satisfied by his explanation that, “I chose seven cities and counties across the Yangtze Delta for intensive study. This selection was not based on whether the sites were typical or unique (some would prove to be one, some the other, and some both), but only on whether the documentation was sufficiently dense to allow for a more than superficial portrait of what local people did in the face of military occupation…After the case studies were written, I chose to include in the book five that were sufficiently distinct in terms of the themes that the sources allowed me to explore…”1 and did not find any of his major claims to be based solely on individual findings in any one city or place. On the contrary, I imagine the accusation of generalization would be particularly offensive to Brook since he has urged the reader to try to overcome some of the stereotypes and classic images we have of the wartime collaborators and allow for the many different forms and levels of cooperation with the occupying forces, their varying motivations, costs, and ultimately levels of moral responsibility.

  Glosser for some reason takes issue with the fact that Brook uses the term “pacification teams” which is a direct translation of the Japanese term. She seems so concerned that we maintain a sufficiently condemnatory tone in our work on Japan’s activities in occupied China that this direct translation doesn’t seem to be sufficiently insidious. I find no issue with the fact that he calls these teams by the best English translation available (“pacification” is originally 宣撫, which in one of its two related definitions in Japanese specifically means to pacify a people in an occupied territory), especially since he does not, by this, ever try to hide the fact that the Japanese were guilty of horrible atrocities.

  She says that he uses the word “pacification” for “his own description of events (p. 134)” but I can’t find any use of that word on the page, for any purpose. Instead, page 134 makes use of another term which we are all familiar with, when he discusses Japanese “counterinsurgency operations” in Nanjing. It is on the same page where he notes Japanese military promises to offer “care for disarmed Chinese soldiers” even as they carried out a policy of executing captured soldiers in Nanjing and, at the bottom of that page tells of the summary execution of fifty policemen which had just been promised permission to operate after negotiations with Nanjing’s International Committee.

  Finally, Glosser seems to think that Brook has a “neutral stance” with respect to collaboration and wants to “avoid moral judgments.” I’m afraid this kind of comment shows that she has completely misread Brook’s careful argument. Perhaps she missed Brook’s simple request in his introduction that, “All I ask of the reader is to suspend judgment as to who is guilty for having worked with the Japanese until after we have seen them at work.”2 Brook wants to point out that the costs and consequences of collaboration, its form, and the motivations are all very much tied up in the contingencies of specific situations. Also, he reminds us that, “Ambiguity of intention is only half the problem. There is also the ambiguity of unknowable consequences.”3 He is “neutral” to collaboration in one important respect: the word “collaboration” is already a morally loaded word, and I think he would argue that without some special care, this can get in the way of any interesting and productive look at the interactions between Chinese and Japanese during the war.

  I think Glosser fundamentally misunderstands Brook when she protests his claim that “history does not fashion moral subjects, nor produce moral knowledge.” I completely agree with her when she says that, “All histories [are] embedded in an ethical view of the world.”4 However, I’m not sure how Brook is to be understood as denying this. Brook admits how his own “ethical view of the world” has affected his description of some of the historical figures he describes in the book. On the very same page as his comment about moral knowledge, he has this to say, “Without question, many of [the choices of collaborators] were venal in inspiration and destructive in impact, and the historian is not disqualified from documenting that venality or tracking the damage these choices led to and declaring them to be damaging. I have found it impossible to suspend my personal distaste for some of the characters who appear in this book, and it would be facetious to suggest that the reader should, particularly when the consequences of collaboration were as stark as they were in a place like Nanjing.” I think what Brook, who it might be noted collected and edited the important Documents on the Rape of Nanking (1999), wants to argue for is a more careful consideration of some of the “inconvenient facts” that produce a more complex picture – a complexity that we must face if we are to have any chance at understanding the kinds of choices faced by individuals every day in extreme times. It is because of some of these ambiguities that we cannot “deduce the causes that prompted people to act from the moral claims we impose, nor evaluate their actions solely in relation to consequences the actors could not anticipate.”5 This is as true for collaborators with the Japanese occupation regime as it is with anyone who collaborated with Chinese Communist regime in its most violent hour, and as it is for the daily choices of policemen, soldiers and government officials of an occupied Iraq today. An analytic calculus of atrocity and the clarity of hindsight does not help us in the least in understanding the people thrust into extreme positions during times such as war, occupation, imperial domination, or under highly repressive governments — or for that matter the choices they faced.

  1. Timothy Brook Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 26-27.

  2. ibid. 13.

  3. ibid. 241.

  4. Susan Glossar review of Brook’s book in Journal of Asian Studies vol. 65 no. 1, 149