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• 作者：八月·水语 发布时间：2012-05-30 17:16:42

  作为一个大学文科生，从薛定谔的猫开始就看不懂了……

• 作者：默默 发布时间：2020-02-01 22:03:46

  逻辑很差，很多内容生硬，不清不楚，看着很难受

• 作者：vanessa 发布时间：2022-07-04 13:09:28

  改版之后确实考试难度增加了。还是更喜欢以前北京语言大学出版社那套的样式，这个纸张质量好差，用什么笔写都会透，对做笔记非常不友好。

• 作者：岁月泡沫 发布时间：2023-08-11 16:44:42

  这种短篇集还不错，能发现不少好作家

• 作者：牛霸田 发布时间：2015-04-04 14:41:18

  责编真是马虎粗糙

• 作者：Scipio 发布时间：2014-09-17 23:31:07

  非常好，不愧获奖著作。讲解美国的资产经过债券化，然后风险评估再出售，最终形成庞大的高风险债券市场，最终像泡泡一样越吹越大，最终引发金融海啸。

• 贴一篇亚马逊上近400点赞的书评

  作者：moviejunkie 发布时间：2015-03-12 15:22:35

  本来是随手翻看书评，找了篇点赞最多的点进去。一下被那种清晰、有力、简洁的语言吸引了。

  明明是”枯燥“”正经“的哲学论文，书评的最后一段却出人意料地拨动人的心弦：So this book is a kind of curative "nonsense", like a purgative for the soul; it is meant to cleanse the mind of philosophical confusion (that is, of philosophy itself) and, at the end, to remove itself as the final piece of "confusion". To use a computer metaphor, the Tractatus is a program that wipes your whole philosophical "hard drive", and erases itself as its final operation. And after that final erasure, we return to the ordinary world, free of philosophy, in the deafening silence that is our acknowledgement of "das Mystiche"--the mystical in, and above, the ordinary. ---------这本书有点像治愈人的“扯淡“，像灵魂的炼狱；它想荡涤头脑中的哲学迷思（其实就是哲学本身），并最终将自己作为最后的”迷思“清除掉。用计算机术语来比喻就是，Tractatus是一个把你的整个哲学”硬盘“擦除的程序，其最后一步运算是清除自己。在这终极清理以后，我们从哲学中解脱，在振聋发聩的沉默中重归平凡世界，那沉默即是我们对”das Mystiche" - 俗世之内及超越俗世的神秘 - 的认可。

  实在喜欢这个书评就开始看这位评家的其他书评，发现几乎都是05年以前的。好奇心使然去人肉，链到了朋友，同事和家人为他建的网站，看了”about"，原来这位评家是位哲学博士，2008年30多岁时就英年早逝了。而他的朋友同事描述他的哲学的话也让人动容：Desire to see things better, trust in one’s own headlights, hope that they will light the windy way, and love to embrace the truth we find and live it: this is Sophia(这个不是人名，是“智慧”的意思，哲学philosophy其实直译就是“爱智”). The desire requires the trust in our own abilities, the trust implies that we have hope, and the hope implies that we love what we hope to get: they are not many but one, wisdom, as Guha might have said. Philosophy began for him with technical questions about the certainty of scientific theories and it led him beyond the merely technical to a way of living the life of the mind, a way anyone can see the value in.

  --------书评原文如下--------

  By S. Guha

  Since most of the reviews of the Tractatus here contain either fawning praise or vituperation without much expository content, it may perhaps be useful to give an account, in reasonably clear terms, of what this book is actually about. Granted that my account is somewhat simplified, it will still be better than quasi-mystical gushing praise or bitter unargued criticism. The central idea of the Tractatus is expressed very clearly at proposition 4.01 and certain comments following it:

  "A proposition is a picture of reality.

  A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it." ［4.01］

  "At first sight a proposition--one set out on the printed page, for example--does not seem to be a picture of the reality with which it is concerned. But neither do written notes seem at first sight to be a picture of a piece of music . . . And yet these sign-languages prove to be pictures, even in the ordinary sense, of what they represent." ［4.011］

  "A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound-waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world.

  They are all construed according to a common logical pattern." ［4.014］

  So, Wittgenstein's basic view in the Tractatus is simple: statements ("propositions") are pictures or models of the situations they are about. The sequence of words "The cat is on the mat" would be taken by him to picture the situation that consists in one object (the cat) standing in a certain relation (being on) to another object (the mat). Or rather, this would be the way to understand this proposition if the cat and mat themselves were indivisible atoms, without any smaller parts. Since, actually, the cat is made up of a great many smaller parts, as is the mat, the full analysis of "The cat is on the mat" would be much more complicated. But basically, a proposition is a picture of the situation it describes just as the notes on a sheet of music depict a melody, and just as the written letters "pop" depict a certain sound. In breaking down the cat and the mat, we must eventually come to a point where things can't be broken down any further, with objects that are the basic constituents of reality. The relationships between these basic objects, which Wittgenstein just calls "objects", but which others have called "logical atoms", constitute the most elementary situations. These situations are described by what he calls "elementary propositions". Given a bunch of elementary propositions, we can combine and re-combine them by certain basic operations, called truth-functional operations, which are explained in any textbook of elementary formal logic. Two such operations are conjunction and negation. So, given three atoms, a, b, and c, and a relation R (R might be the relation "being on", as with the cat and the mat), we have, as elementary propositions, for instance:

  aRb ("a is on b")

  bRc ("b is on c")

  aRc ("a is on c")

  Then we can make new, compound propositions like

  (aRb & bRc)

  ~aRc

  (aRb & bRc) & ~aRc

  Where "&" just means "and", as in "The cat is on the mat and the cherry is on the tree", and "~" means "It is not the case that", as in "It is not the case that the cat is on the mat". So the first of the above three compounds means "a is on b and b is on c", and the second means "It is not the case that a is on c", that is, a is not on c. You can easily work out the third one for yourself.

  By means of operations like this (actually, Wittgenstein uses a different, but equivalent operation), one can build up an enormous stock of compound propositions. In fact, according to Wittgenstein, anything that can be said at all can be said by taking elementary propositions and applying operations like this repeatedly (albeit you might have to apply such operations infinitely, or to an infinite collection of propositions). Basically, then, given the simplest pictures of the world, we can stitch them together into more and more complicated pictures, and these yield all the statements and thoughts we can make, or at least all the ones that make any sense. Every meaningful statement ultimately breaks down to elementary propositions, propositions entirely in terms of simple signs or names (like "a" and "b") that stand for logical atoms. Everything that can be said meaningfully can, in principle, be broken down like this. This is the basic idea of logical atomism. Most of the technical work in this book consists of machinery for reducing all propositions of science and mathematics to combinations of elementary propositions. In the process, Wittgenstein shows you, he thinks, how to reduce claims with notions like "all" and "some" (like "All whales are mammals", "Some lawyers are crooks") and numerical claims ("There are four books on the shelf") to combinations of elementary propositions. If Wittgenstein succeeds in this, he considers himself to have shown that his "picture theory" of language is correct.

  Okay, now you want to know, what's the *philosophical* point of all this? Well, for one thing, it means that anything you *can't* picture cannot be expressed by a meaningful proposition. If you try to speak of things that can't be pictured in Wittgenstein's way, you end up talking nonsense, in that what you are saying won't be true or false. Such utterances may express how you feel, or they may serve some other function (besides saying something) but they won't *say* anything that can be true (or false), and so there won't be any point in *arguing* about it. And what "things" are these, that you can't meaningfully talk about? The short answer is, all of traditional philosophy. Take ethics, for instance: "things" like right and wrong, or good and bad, can't be pictured, and so ethical "propositions" like "Murder is wrong" don't say anything. Maybe they express your feelings, or reflect some psychological fact, but they are not true or false. Likewise for religious claims that defy picturing, like "God is love" or "Brahman manifests itself in all things". Likewise for metaphysical claims about God or substance or causation or any underlying non-empirical reality. Likewise for epistemological worries about justification or rationality; these cannot be pictured in the requisite way either (hence Wittgenstein dismisses skepticism as nonsense). Wittgenstein's views of language are *so* restrictive that most of what philosophers have wanted to talk about turn out to fall into the category of the unspeakable, what he calls "the mystical". The mystical is what cannot be pictured, what is therefore beyond the realm of logic, reasoning, and articulate speech. About it, Wittgenstein claims, we cannot speak, and therefore we should be silent.

  Oddly enough, Wittgenstein's own book turns out to be an attempt to talk about the mystical. For one of the things that cannot be pictured, is the very fact, as Wittgenstein takes it to be, that propositions are pictures of reality. (Think about it: how can you make a picture that says that propositions are pictures of reality? There's no way to do it along the lines of "The cat is on the mat", is there?) In fact, every attempt to talk about the relation between language and reality is itself an attempt to speak of the unspeakable, to attempt to characterize what can't be pictured. Wittgenstein recognizes this and responds thus:

  "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them--as steps--to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)

  He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright." ［6.54］

  Wittgenstein's Tractatus itself, then, is a violation of his commandment to be silent in the face of the mystical. And once it is *recognized* as a violation, Wittgenstein hopes you will throw the book away and return to the ordinary, empirical world, free of any further desire to do philosophy, having gotten a clear vision of language and the world that makes it obvious to you that philosophy is a mistaken attempt to speak of the unspeakable. (You can now see why this book provokes bitter hostility in those who cherish traditional philosophy--after all, it says they're wasting their time!) But if so, how can Wittgenstein himself be right in writing the book? Isn't *it* a mistaken attempt to speak about the unspeakable? Yes and no. Yes, it *is* an attempt to say what can't be said--hence, once you understand it, paradoxically, you see that it's nonsense! But it is not a *mistaken* attempt, rather it is a self-conscious attempt, made necessary by our confusion and unclarity about the world while we are still enmeshed in the tangles of traditional philosophy. While that nonsense imprisons us, we cannot recognize it *as* nonsense, and as such, like mentally deranged people, we have to be approached *with* nonsense if we are to be cured--nonsense is all we respond to. So this book is a kind of curative "nonsense", like a purgative for the soul; it is meant to cleanse the mind of philosophical confusion (that is, of philosophy itself) and, at the end, to remove itself as the final piece of "confusion". To use a computer metaphor, the Tractatus is a program that wipes your whole philosophical "hard drive", and erases itself as its final operation. And after that final erasure, we return to the ordinary world, free of philosophy, in the deafening silence that is our acknowledgement of "das Mystiche"--the mystical in, and above, the ordinary.

• 用13.8元改变你的人生

  作者：momo 发布时间：2013-01-17 18:13:20

  很长一段时间里，豆瓣不时会有友邻冒出来说下《小狗钱钱》这本书，虽然我关注的人已经够少了（之前只有50个），但这么高频出现的一本书还是不得不引起我的好奇心。好几次想下单买，但是每次看到亚马逊上的介绍——“全球畅销理财的启蒙读物，让孩子在快乐阅读中学会理财”——我就放弃了购书的欲望。因为这只不过是一本启蒙的书，而且是写给小朋友们的。而我，已经是阿姨辈的人了，难道还需要读这种启蒙读物吗？哼，那种不屑简直呼之欲出。

  可是禁不起再三的引诱，好奇心还是战胜理性。我买了这本13.8的书，而这本书可以被评为我的2013年度启蒙书，评分五颗星。因为这么好，所以想与众乐乐。

  1，你要能够听见。

  书是以童话的方式写的，小狗钱钱和它12岁的小主人一起成长，学习理财。不可思议的是小狗钱钱会说话。当然，我们觉得以拟人化的手法去写动物的对话并不奇怪，可是作者让小女孩意识到小狗不应该说话，可也以此告诉所有的读者：世间万物大部分时候都是沉默的，可它不言自明。除非你去听了，除非你去理解了，否则你永远都不会明白这本书的价值，然后，除非你去付诸实践了，否则你也不会有任何改变，13.8给你带来的或许只是一本落灰的书。

  2，你要真的愿意实现你的梦想

  “大多数人都并不清楚自己想要的是什么，他们只知道，自己想得到更多的东西。我们必须确切地知道自己心里渴望的是什么才行。”

  虽然可能你并不知道自己这辈子最想完成什么，但是你至少可以知道自己今年想达成什么目标，或者可以是这个月，这个礼拜，哪怕至少是今天。世界上99%的人都没有富裕到可以不用再考虑未来的生活，随心所欲地安享人生，而剩下的1%即便可以如此，他们却会放弃这个权利，追求实现梦想的快乐。所以你一定会有想要完成的梦想。比如，现在，我就希望你看到这篇文章的时候会去下单买一本《小狗钱钱》（我不是书托，你买不买书对我都没有任何影响，to do or not to do ,it's your business），然后放下一切傲慢，认真学习。

  3，你要马上去做。

  “当你决定做一件事情的时候，你必须在72小时之内完成，否则你很可能永远不会再做了。”

  很多事情，我们并不是做不了，而是没有去做。因为我们当时的拖延。很久之前，我看过一部电影《深夜加油站遇见苏格拉底》，这是一部非常非常好看的小众电影（虽然豆瓣评分只有7.9），但是我还是强烈推荐。当时看完之后，我决定写一篇很长很长的影评，但是我没有这么去做，只是想着会去做。而到今天，我还是没有去写，因为我已经快把电影的内容忘记了，虽然当时留给我的震撼那么强烈。每年我都会去写计划，每年我都会去写年终总结，可我总是把它拖到农历年的时候才去做，但那时候我不是在放寒假，就是在过春节，那样的氛围根本不适合去写这样严肃的东西，所以没有经过认真思考的年度计划，总是很难被认真执行。

  4，你得坚持去做。

  “首先，在遇到困难的时候，仍然要坚持自己的想法；第二点，在一切进展非常顺利的情况下，你也应该做这些事情。”

  都说坚持是很困难的事情，尤其是在困难的时候。其实不是这样的，有过去坚持做一件事情的人都会有这样的体验：很多事情，没有坚持做，不是在我们很困难的时候，而是在我们过得很轻松惬意的时候。从2012年4月27日开始，我去扇贝背单词，截止今天一共是265天，而我坚持打卡的天数是206天，回顾一下，除开那些没有网络的日子，我大部分没有打卡的日子都是在生活比较惬意的时候。因为那些天里，我更多是沉浸在我的快乐里，而忘记了我的坚持。虽然如此，我的打卡率还是到了77.7%，我不是骄傲，至少我在2012年培养了一个好习惯。

  坚持去做一件事，真得是一件很困难的事情，即便那件事情是你很喜欢做的。这个时候你要学习将你的行为固化成习惯。关于这些，有很多内容值得探讨。你可以参考《自控力》这本书，学习如何让自己的生活变得从容。

  5，最重要的，你要确定你想要的是什么。

  虽然大多数人并不会像哲学家一样天天追问人生的意义，我是谁之类的终极命题。但是，很多人也放弃了去追问自己——到底我这一生想做点什么。大富大贵，功成名就是他们不敢想的事情，因此，他们就觉得其他的中等愿望，微不足道的梦想都是不值一提的，因而也就放弃了对生活的反省，对自己的反省，而随波逐流，泯然众人。

  这个世界上最珍贵的礼物都是我们自己争取来的。所以我们要克服丢面子的恐惧，让世界向我们敞开大门。我们可以记录自己的成功，坚持每天去做，对自己，对自己的生活，对世界，还有对成功的规律去做深入的思考，每天只要10分钟，总结自己的生活，记录成功，就会让我们有更多的勇气去面对未知的世界，去接近我们的梦想，去做更大的梦，去成为我们想要成为的人。但，最重要的，你得确定你想要的是什么！！！

  关于这本书，有很多内容值得探讨，有很多工具可以分享，但是今天就写这么多吧，那些分享的东西，只要愿意，都可以找到。豆瓣达人水湄物语写的《跟着钱钱学理财》系列，有不少人喜欢，你也可以去看看，但我还是更喜欢看原汁原味的书。