常用形容词分类词典 pdf mobi txt 2024 电子版 下载

形容词是表示人和事物的性质、状态或动作、行为变化状态的词。将形容词按词义分类编排是把表达同一义类的词归纳在一起，读者在使用时，发既可辨析词义、选择用词，又能丰富词汇和增加有关知识。

对形容词的见解，可谓各家有别。本词典参考我国传统分类辞书和现代中外分类词汇、分类辞典的分类方法，并依照实用原则，将所收录的近3700条形容词分为41个义类。有的形容词所表示的意义不止一个，则在不同的义类中分列。如[宽大]一词，既形容面积或容积大，又表示对人宽容厚道，则按词义分列在地势・面积类与为人・处世类；又如[华贵]一词，既形容华丽珍贵，又表示豪华富贵，则按词义分列在价值・等级类与贫富・俭奢类。

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形容词是表示人和事物的性质、状态或动作、行为变化状态的词。将形容词按词义分类编排是把表达同一义类的词归纳在一起，读者在使用时，发既可辨析词义、选择用词，又能丰富词汇和增加有关知识。

对形容词的见解，可谓各家有别。本词典参考我国传统分类辞书和现代中外分类词汇、分类辞典的分类方法，并依照实用原则，将所收录的近3700条形容词分为41个义类。有的形容词所表示的意义不止一个，则在不同的义类中分列。如[宽大]一词，既形容面积或容积大，又表示对人宽容厚道，则按词义分列在地势・面积类与为人・处世类；又如[华贵]一词，既形容华丽珍贵，又表示豪华富贵，则按词义分列在价值・等级类与贫富・俭奢类。

• 作者：Efei 发布时间：2013-11-06 21:07:29

  CRM对工业品企业营销管理的价值有几何？

• 作者：压伤的芦苇 发布时间：2014-12-26 13:47:10

  他是要来跟我们相爱的，并且这相爱中，不仅包括了那些美好的瞬间，那些立约、祝福、胜利，也包括了很多不那么美好的回忆——那些争吵、警告、咒诅，离家出走，感情濒临破裂……正如同任何一段关系的组成，都必须要经历过这些不断破碎再重建的过程，才能长出真正成熟持久又彼此信任的情感。在这样的关系里，人真正获得自由，真正成为他自己，也真正得到完全的安息。与我们执着于改造自己的行为相比，神显然更关注我们的喜怒哀乐，因为他要的，是完完全全的得到我们的心。

• 作者：桦尺蛾 发布时间：2020-10-14 01:01:04

  条理清晰。

• 作者：kayoko 发布时间：2019-08-13 01:34:54

  一般，没太大作用

• 作者：青菜萝卜小兔子 发布时间：2020-06-30 00:40:27

  在有些小说里，苦难类似于一种精神咖啡，其叙述处处透露出作者品尝咖啡时的精神满足，仿佛只要给人物穿上苦难的外衣，就具备了道德上的优越感，一切行为都可以绿灯放行。而在郑小驴的笔下，苦难不仅是在书写自己的体验，也是在书写对文学经典的理解。他用苦难调和出小说阴郁滞重的底色，但是骨子里的青春气息和叛逆精神并没有被压抑住，因此在深沉的字里行间经常会跳荡出阳光般的色彩。

  孟子说成就大业者都曾经历过一番艰苦磨炼，但却没说有多少人郁郁一生白了头。“天将降大任于是人”是劝勉和鼓励，“苦其心志，劳其筋骨”是苦难所予，而最终“动心忍性，曾益其所不能”的还是自己。

  若你某天从苦难之中走了出来，不必感谢苦难，而是应该感谢曾经那个披荆斩棘从未放弃的自己，你对苦难时期的怀念，也只是怀念那个时候意气风发壮志凌云的自己啊。

• 作者：智术师 发布时间：2021-11-22 20:39:20

  内容十分详实，不过阅读体验一般。

• 她半生闭门不出，却写出最叛逆奇崛的诗作

  作者：中信出版文艺生 发布时间：2022-04-02 10:50:15

  最近发现一部宝藏剧集《狄金森》，这部每集30分钟的美剧，是一部

  聚焦于美国诗人艾米莉·狄金森（Emily Dickinson）生活的喜剧

  ，复现了这位天才女作家的个人成长之路。

  

  

  

  一共三季，每一季评分都很高。

  狄金森自幼忠于阅读和写作，不断自我创造，不断努力摆脱性别、家庭、社会的偏见与束缚，世人评价她为二十世纪现代主义诗歌先驱，比肩著名诗人惠特曼，对美国文学做出重大独创性贡献。

  

  《狄金森》引入了现代剧的拍摄手法，巧妙地演绎少女幻想，并用荒诞幽默的情节创作包裹严肃内核，让这部短剧在庄重的历史人物传记和青少年成长轻喜剧之间自由切换。

  事实上，狄金森是美国文学史最难以索解的一个谜。

  她生前无人知晓，死后却盛誉如潮，被称为“诗界梵高”。

  狄金森25岁后便选择闭门不出，

  即便现在人们对她的真实生活面貌仍充满疑惑，但这并不影响她成为具有划时代意义的伟大诗人。

  正如剧中所表达的那样:“两百年后被记住的狄金森只有你。”

  

  

  天赋的少女，思辨的独立精神

  1830年，在美国阿默斯特，一户当地极富名望的家族迎来了他们的第二个孩子。

  他们无论如何也不会想到这个孩子终身未婚，更想不到她半生闭门不出，却在日后成为19世纪天才女诗人，她的名字就是艾米莉·狄金森。 狄金森虽然半生闭门不出，但这并没有限制她的

  诗歌创作

  。她的创作反而打破之前古典诗歌固有的形式，以一种

  新的风格，成为现代主义诗歌先驱，

  曾有评论家说道：“惠特曼和狄金森写诗，都好像从不曾有人写过诗似的。”

  而狄金森这种不被当时传统文化所规束的作品风格，与她始

  终保持思辨的独立精神密不可分。

  而这种思辨精神，在上学时就让她显现出不从众于同龄人的独立认知。

  

  狄金森对于世事的洞察，从未被世俗的规范所压制，这也造就了她对诗意深刻而独具慧根的理解和感悟。

  “诗意就在那里。诗意并不存在于浮夸的言辞中，而隐藏在那薄薄蛋壳下，在即将诞生的小生灵的心间。”

  这些理解

  超越了她所处时代的教育和观念

  ，文学评论家哈罗德·布鲁姆曾在《西方正典》中这样评论狄金森： “我们感到困惑不是因为她独特的魅力，而是因为

  她思想的力量。”

  狄金森这种思想的力量无疑成为她诗歌与众不同的魅力，哈罗德·布鲁姆将这些内化在诗歌中的精华称为

  “认知原创性”。

  

  它象征着

  独立思考的自我精神

  ，而这一可贵的精神却在100多年后的今天逐渐模糊。 信息化泛滥的时代，人们常常忙着追逐一个又一个的热点，却渐渐忽视身在其中迷失的自我。可越是这样寻找自我的过程中，越是需要我们保持“认知原创性”，保持思辨的独立精神，因为无论什么时代，无论美丑胖瘦，

  我们的魅力终究由我们的思想决定它的上限。

  

  不拘的天性，纯真的生活信念

  在狄金森身上我们既能看到她洞察万物的聪慧，也能看到她

  永葆纯真的可贵。

  狄金森出生在19世纪的美国，那是一个男女仍不平等，奴隶制还存在的时代。她的祖父是阿默斯特州学院的创始人，父亲是当地首席律师，思想保守，狄金森还有一个哥哥和一个妹妹。父亲对她们表面和蔼，实则严厉。

  而即便生长在传统观念森严的世家中，从小受到正统的宗教教育，

  狄金森却出人意表地古灵精怪。

  

  她头脑中总是充斥着各种出其不意的“鬼点子”，和所谓的大家闺秀大相径庭，她会在平安夜聆听一只知更鸟吱吱地诉说它的故事，也会因为贪吃去触犯家庭的戒律。而当她走出被关禁闭的房间时，母亲在她脸上必然看不出一丝忏悔之情。

  可面对惩罚不以为然的狄金森，却在多年后回忆三兄妹的童年时，放声痛哭。美国画家奥蒂斯·艾伦·布拉德曾为三个孩子画了一张肖像，

  像是把大人的样子缩小成儿童的比例。

  “他们眼神凌厉，鼻头尖锐，笑容呆滞。三人除了着装不同，相貌如出一辙。”

  

  狄金森看着长大后的兄弟姐妹会发现，童年的这张照片似乎是对未来的一种预示。

  长大真的就意味着要埋葬韶华，成为“笑容呆滞”的人吗？那如果这样，狄金森宁愿不要，所以

  她回到狄金森老宅，25岁后终身未踏出家门。

  “好不容易回到童年的居所，她发誓再也不要离开——无论是房子，还是童年。”

  那个白色的房子里

  不仅留住了她的童年，也成为她捍卫精神纯真的阵地。

  狄金森的诗歌大多出自她闭门不出的这一时期，追求天性美让她的诗歌创作别具一格，虽以描写日常生活的普通事物为主，但内容深邃，直达本质。

  爱情与绝望，痛苦与狂喜，死亡与永生

  等都是狄金森诗歌的重要主题。

  

  “我本可以忍受黑暗，如果我不曾见过太阳。然而阳光已使我的荒凉，成为更新的荒凉。”这首广为流传的诗句正是出自艾米莉·狄金森的诗作。 在这首诗歌里我们看到了一个尝过真正的孤独，便不再惧怕黑暗的勇士。

  而生活中，

  我们需要这样的勇气，来捍卫自己的理想之境。

  

  诗是自由乐园，我居于无限可能

  加拿大作家多米尼克·福捷

  基于狄金森的诗歌、资料、信件等诸多研究内容追溯狄金森的一生。

  她不拘泥于传统的传记形式，将狄金森迸发诗歌的生活片段娓娓道来，时而代入狄金森，时而又切换到现实，一步步揭开狄金森留给世人的“谜”，

  同时也完成了对自我精神的探索。

  于是，便有了这部比“传记”更具精魂的作品——《

  我居于无限可能：艾米莉·狄金森的一生》。

  

  《我居于无限可能》中描绘了

  一个孤独又灿烂的诗人

  ，却从未刻意去寻找狄金森隐居的答案，两个遵从内心的灵魂或许在这一刻相遇了。

  这些灵魂共振的时刻或许促成了多米尼克·福捷的灵光乍现，她不再纠结是否需要造访狄金森的白色故居，却在方寸之地，从纸间再造了一座“城市”，一座只属于狄金森的城市，正如狄金森在纸间为自己创造了一个诗意和鲜花永恒的世界。 我栖居于可能性-一座比散文更美的房子-更多的窗户数不胜数-房门-更高级- 房间皆如雪松-肉眼望不穿-一座永恒的屋顶-苍穹的扇面- 访客-完美无比-来这里-安居-伸展我狭小的双手把乐园汇聚- 狄金森在芳华绽放时放弃社交闭门不出，

  把热烈的爱和青春都奉献给了诗歌创作，她将那些没有公之于众的表达都写在了纸上

  ，留下了近1800首诗作。

  她小心翼翼地呵护着，不在乎这些诗是否能发表，在乎的只有花儿、植物和诗歌，却获得了恒久的幸福，时代的风浪在她小小的港湾里不过是数圈涟漪。

  

  

  《我居于无限可能》正是追寻了狄金森那些

  对于生活的感知，对于自然、诗意和万物保持纯真却本质的探索

  ，而这些文字，都将使我们在晦暗不明的现实中窥探到郁郁葱葱的光明。 它让我们在诗意氛围中认识了这位现代主义诗歌先驱，这位热情叛逆的少女，也完成了当代女作家对19世纪天才女诗人的致敬。

  中文版本还邀请国内权威狄金森学者精心编选

  40余首狄金森诗歌，

  搭配正文情节出现，如同巧妙地揭开狄金森生活的密语，不动声色地展现这些诗歌的隐秘，在阅读中回到诗歌本身，体验狄金森的诗歌热情。

  书的封面及版式设计精巧，随书附赠两张手稿、植物明信片，重现“狄金森式”暗潮涌动的细节，手稿、老宅、肖像、邮票、蜜蜂与四叶草……这本诗人狄金森的传记集齐了一个诗人所需的一切。

  

  再没什么比散文诗般的记述，更能成为狄金森的传记，《我居于无限可能》是

  诗人狄金森生平的一种可能性，但对千万读者来说，也是无限的可能性。

  这种可能性存在于每个人的心中，唯有自己相信，它才可以实现。

• 第7章摘抄&笔记

  作者：舒袖 发布时间：2021-01-24 03:23:36

  Chapter 7 The neuroscience of free will 自由意志的神经科学

  pp.222-257

  pp.222

  Can neuroscience, and the other sciences of the mind, shed light on one of the oldest and most difficult of all philosophical problems, the problem of free will and moral responsibility?

  But if we were determined to act as we did, then we were not free, or morally responsible.

  P.223

  当代有很多哲学家是相容论者，他们认为

  自由意志和决定论是可相容的

  。

  相容论者的论证：

  1.对于强迫、控制等的因果性问题，自由意志与决定论是不相容的。I am unfree, certainly, if my actions are controlled by another agent: if, for instance, my desires and beliefs are simply irrelevant to what I end up doing. If someone physically manipulates me, or holds a gun to my head, then my actions have their source in someone else, and I am not responsible for them.

  但问题是，决定论者determinism的事实证据并不能说明我们的行为是被他人强迫或控制的。即使他们是对的，但理性施动者依然有做他们喜欢的事情的自由。

  2.如果第一条的判断很难，那么简单的问法是：自由意志如何与indeterminism（非决定论）【不确定性理论】相容？(p.224)

  举例量子力学，用概率而非决定的等式（deterministic equations）来描述亚原子粒子的行为。On the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, these equations capture the nature of physical reality: the equations are probabilistic because the world is fundamentally indeterministic.但是，当代物理学对非相容论者支持保留自由意志的观点的帮助有限：

  2.1即使在亚原子层面是自由的，但是到了宏观的角度这些特色或许就被消除了，一切行为都变得可预测。（所以一切看上去都是被决定的和可预测的：亚原子层面的非决定性似乎被抹去了）

  2.2假设亚原子层面的非决定论能影响人在宏观上的复杂行为，那有什么帮助呢？If I am not free, despite the fact that I can do what I want when I want, how does the fact that sometimes – due to a random event – I

  fail

  to do what I want when I want to enhance my freedom?这样结果就恰恰相反：非决定性会减少（而不是增加）我的自由，因为我并不能控制亚原子的行为。

  不相容论者通常会认为，将确定性等同于强制或外部控制是错误的。但他们还有其他理由认为确定性与自由意志不相容。他们指出，即使我们能做所有我们能够做的事情，我们也依然不是自由的：如当别人控制着我们的欲望的时候。

  相容论者对此的回应是：区分了一阶和二阶的欲望。【一阶是我喜欢xx；二阶是我希望我喜欢xx】——我们可能在一阶上是不自由的，但是我们可以在二阶上是自由的。

  （但不相容论者也在关于因果论的信念上有更多的差异差异：Some incompatibilists are determinists, and therefore hold that there is no free will in our world (Pereboom 2001). Some deny that determinism is true; they therefore hold that some actions (at least) are free. These incompatibilists are known as libertarians (Kane 1996; Ekstrom 1999; O’Connor 2000).

  P.225

  本章主旨：1.回顾是否有自由意志的难题，以及道德责任（神经科学家论证我们是不自由的，并不是因为我们的行为是被决定的，而是因为我们不能意识到是什么造成了我们的行为）2.在个体层面考察我们不断增长的知识对于心灵的认识；3.从而来论证，神经科学所展示的不是没有人可以负责，而是说谁是要负责的，而谁不是。Rather than neuroscience showing that no one is ever responsible, I shall argue, attention to its discoveries will help us to see who is responsible, and who is not.

  who decides when I decide?当我做决定的时候，是什么在做决定？

  一般认为： consciousness plays no direct role in decision-making or volition

  但是像(Libet et al. 1983). 这样的人，做了实验，检测出 ‘‘readiness potential’’ (RP) 可读性潜能，会在行动的400毫秒前发生；所以，主体对行为的意识是在RP实现的之后才产生的。

  这个实验被看作证明没有自由意志的经验性证据。 Libet 也说，意志或行动在因果性上来得太慢了（不高效）

  但是，作为我们所要赞美或批评的施动者，如果不是与意识不同，那至少是与意识在亚人格层面上因果性有效的机制相比，要与意识更加同一。事实证明，我们不做决定，而是决定因我们而造。但，如果我们不能控制自己能够做出什么决定，那么我们就不能为我们的行动负责。

  But the agent, the target of ascriptions of praise and blame, is, if not identical to consciousness, at least more properly identified with consciousness than with the subpersonal mechanisms that are, as a matter of fact, causally effective in action. It turns out that we do not make our decisions; they are made for us. But if we cannot control what we decide to do, then we cannot be responsible for our decisions (Zhu 2004).3

  P.228

  介绍 Wegner’s version of the threat

  他和libet结论相同： that consciousness does not initiate action. 意识不引发行为。

  P.229

  他区分了两种意志：1) phenomenal will – our experience of our will as causally effective – and 2) the empirical will; the actual causal mechanisms of behavior.

  当我们将第一个错误误认为第二个名称时，当我们将因果关系的经验直接反映为现实时，就产生了同义的“意识意志的幻象”。实际上，我们的经验是行动迟来的，不可靠的记录。 它本身既不是因果力，也不是实际因果力的直接反映。

  Neither has demonstrated, anywhere near conclusively, that consciousness does not initiate action or make decisions. 【意识并不能引发行为也不能做决定】However, though these philosophers have won this battle, I suspect they will lose the war: consciousness does not, in fact, play the kind of role in action that Libet and Wegner believe to be required in order for us to be morally responsible. 【所以，意识也不能负道德责任】We should therefore get on with assessing whether, and how, moral responsibility might be compatible with the finding that consciousness does not initiate actions or make decisions

  P.231

  consciousness and moral responsibility 意识与道德责任

  似乎，意识是道德责任所需要的。

  举例 Ken Parks：他梦游开车到自己的公婆家，然后杀了他们，但是没有意识到，后来时候回忆起来，就去告诉警察自己杀人了。

  P.233

  we can identify the self with a much broader network of states and mechanisms; if these states and mechanisms cause our actions, then we cause them.

  If we are not conscious of our decisions at the precise instant we make them, they seem to think, then we do not fully control them. ……If we are fully and actively to control our actions, we require an active causal power to intervene in the decision-making process. 如果我们充分主动地控制自己的行动，则需要积极的因果力量来干预决策过程。

  Decision constraint 决策约束: the alleged requirement that we able to exercise such an active causal power in decision-making

  P.234

  The process of decision-making: either we could weigh our reasons, or we could weight them 【We weigh reasons when we try to find out how significant they are for us, given our beliefs, values, plans, goals and desires. We weight reasons when we assign them a weight and thereby a significance for us, either ignoring any preexisting weight they might have had, or varying it. 】

  【

  衡量理由对你的重要性和相关性；或者忽视或减少理由对你决策的影响

  。】但是，当我们在做决定的时候，是衡量理由对我们的重要性而不是忽略他们。

  p.235

  we take ourselves to be weighing reasons, and not weighting them. We try to discover how much things really do matter to us, not decide to make them matter to us – not, at least, in the way we would if were weighting them.

  P.236

  But, these philosophers argue, if my decisions can only go one way, they are determined, and therefore they are not free. We have already seen that there are reasons to doubt the claim that the mere fact that someone’s actions are determined entails that they are not free; the claim seems even weaker when, as here, the worry is that our decisions are determined by

  our own values and beliefs

  . 作者在这里不去辩护这个意见，他把关注重点集中在衡量权重理由如何能增强我们的自由上。

  If you make decisions by assigning weights to your reasons, varying the weight that they would have for you were you instead to weigh them, you make your decision arbitrarily.

  如果你能通过改变理由的权重而改变选择，那么你的决定就是任意的，就是增加了我们的自由。【作者这里并没有考虑我们的决定是被我们自己的价值观和信念所决定的质疑】

  p.237

  If that’s right, though, we do not need an

  active causal power

  【积极因果力？】at all. Free decision-making can instead be a passive process: it can proceed by way of a mechanism that, like a set of scales, simply aggregates the weight of our reasons and measures which set is the weightier.

  Once we recognize that we do not need or want an active causal power, the claim that consciousness does not learn of the agent’s decisions until after they are already underway no longer seems threatening.

  两个反驳意见：

  1.it might be pointed out that people frequently choose in defiance of their reasons; they suffer from weakness of the will and find themselves choosing against their own better judgment.

  2. it might be held that though we must decide in light of our reasons, we can nevertheless take them as mere guides, rather than as determinants of what we must do: perhaps the weights that our reasons have for us are reported to consciousness, or at any rate to an active causal power that is intrinsically conscious, which then decides whether or not to vary them.

  P.240

  moral responsibility without the decision constraint

  The picture I am urging is this: even though the decision constraint cannot be satisfied, even though consciousness doesn’t make our decisions, consciousness matters for moral responsibility because conscious deliberation – typically – greatly improves the quality of the decisions the subpersonal mechanisms ultimately cause. 意识对于道德责任之所以重要，是因为，深思意识大幅提升了因果性在亚人格层面的决定机制。

  深思也是一个向自己提出问题的过程。仔细考虑问题，以便我们的亚人格机制可以解决这些问题，并将解决方案反馈给我们-从而得到互相的反馈。——因此，我们说高质量的深思更能体现我们真实的自我。

  p.242

  举例：冷血的谋杀要比无意识杀人更不好。 Murder ‘‘in cold blood’’ is worse than unpremeditated killing, because a planned action better reflects my settled convictions, my sense of what really matters, my values, whereas a spontaneous action reflects only a part of my self, and perhaps a relatively inessential part at that.

  Agents like Parks act only on a small subset of their action plans, policies, desires and goals. Their actions do not reflect their deepest selves, their settled convictions. Since the agent was not even conscious, we have good reason to think that their action is less reflective of their identity as practical agents than even the spontaneous and immediate actions of the agent who acts (for instance) under provocation, or who acts negligently. Thus, an action performed in a state of automatism is not attributable to the agent as an individual. Of course, it might be reflective of the agent; a thoroughly bad agent is as susceptible to entering the state of automatism as a good. But when a bad action performed in a state of automatism is reflective of the agent, it is only by chance that this is so. The bad agent did not have the opportunity to think twice, and therefore cannot be blamed for their action. 【当我们的亚人格机制在做决定的时候，才称作是“我们”在做决定。】

  p.243

  我的决定反映了我的历史，学习和经验； 如果我思考的东西没有深深地影响我所做的一切，那么我将以完全无法解释的方式进行选择。

  Decision-making cannot be conscious – that is, caused by consciousness – but that needn’t matter, for the mechanisms that make the decision are nevertheless ours, us; they have our values, they have our beliefs, our goals (we have them by them having them), and when they decide, we decide如果决定决策不能由意识所造就，但那也并不重要，因为那个做决定的机制还是属于我们的，我们有自己的价值观和信念——当它们决定的时候，也就是我们决定。

  P.244

  Lessons from neuroscience

  The forgoing pages were devoted to resolving (to my own satisfaction, at least) the problem of how we can be free even if – even though – consciousness does not cause our actions: in other words, to seeing off a threat from neuroscience. I now want to turn to some more positive lessons from neuroscience, and related fields; lessons we can and ought to apply in our practices of blaming and holding to account, including our practices of punishing wrongdoers. I shall argue that

  our growing understanding of the brain and its pathologies is directly relevant to our moral and legal treatment of one another.

  Some agents who we would currently punish for wrongdoing ought to be excused from all blame; others ought to be punished less severely. In both kinds of cases, we ought to reduce sentences or mitigate censure because

  these agents do not (fully) meet the conditions properly laid down for moral responsibility,

  and

  they do not meet these conditions due to brain abnormalities.

  作者认为应当为行动者免责：1.行动者没有完全满足在为道德责任规定的适当条件，2.大脑出现异常，不能满足这些条件。

  反对意见（认为神经科学不应对我们的道德责任归属产生影响）：

  Gazzaniga (2005), for instance, argues that responsibility is a moral notion, and that morality is one thing and science another. Morse (2004, 2006) argues that those who believe that psychopathology can diminish moral responsibility confuse abnormal causation with excuse.

  Philosophers investigating moral responsibility have usually sought to reveal the underlying logic of responsibility ascriptions. They have typically done this by trying to discover what factors lead us to excuse others of responsibility for actions they have performed. There is a range of situations in which it is uncontroversial that agents ought to be excused, even though they have performed a wrongful act.

  发现vs发明：

  Once we understand the logic of excuses, we see that our practices of praising and blaming reflect facts about the nature of moral reality, as we perceive it. Justifications and excuses are not invented, as Gazzaniga thinks, but

  discovered

  : we rightfully blame another when, and only when, he or she performs a wrongful action that expresses ill will towards others.

  Our moral practices are not mere constructs, but instead

  reflect

  facts

  about the world, and about the nature of

  agents

  in the world: Do they really know what they’re doing? Do they control their actions?

  【于是有了各种认知测试cognitive test】

  the famous M’Naghten Rules

  , introduced in the mid-nineteenth century in England. These rules state that defendants are to be found not guilty if it is proved that:

  at the time of the committing of the act, the party ACCUSED was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong

  .

  p.246

  仅当代理人不了解他或她在做什么时，M'Naghten才会辩解，但如果他们完全理解，但仍无法防止自己做出错误的举动，该怎么办？If the agent was compelled, say by kleptomania, to steal, they do not exhibit any ill will.

  Morse (2004, 2006) argues that abnormal causes are not excusing causes. He is surely right that we can’t infer that an abnormal cause excuses just because it is abnormal. But he is mistaken in thinking that no abnormal cause could be excusing. That depends upon the details of the cause.

  小结：

  We can acquire new knowledge, from neuroscience and allied fields, about whether agents understand (in the relevant fashion) what they are doing when they perform a morally wrongful action, and about whether they possess relevant control over what they do. Neuroscience can therefore expand our knowledge of when the excusing conditions apply.